holding that Nothing can yield nothing, is a philosophic nescience. In other words, the doctrine of the unconditioned is a philosophy confessing relative ignorance, but professing absolute knowledge; while the doctrine of the Conditioned is a philosophy professing relative knowledge, but confessing absolute ignorance " (p. 609). With these views as to human nescience, and the inconclusiveness of the common arguments in behalf of the Divine existence, we cannot coincide. We acknowledge that it is one good consequence of his philosophy that it shows " that no difficulty emerges in theology which had not previously emerged in philosophy " (p. 625). But his doctrine of relativity, more especially in its application to cause and effect, really leaves us nothing by which to prove that God exists. We cannot see how even the moral argument remains if " good and bad" (Dis. p. 604) are subject, as they must be, to the same all-sweeping system of relativity and nescience. We will rejoice to find in his posthumous works principles laid down sufficient to afford a proper basis to natural theology, the truths of which, firmly believed in by the deceased, are far more certain, as well as more sacred, than any philosophic speculations. Meanwhile, we feel constrained in these articles to utter our dissent from some of the principles laid down in the Discussions, but we do so, entertaining all the while the most profound respect for and gratitude to the great metaphysician who has lately been taken from us, after having done more for philosophy than any man of his age.

ART. II.—ON THE PROPERTIES OF MATTER.—(PAGES 77 AND 97.)

The qualities of matter are, according to Locke, of three sorts, the primary, the secondary, and those by which one body acts upon another. (Essay, B. ii. c. 8, § 8-10.) In the text we have treated solely of the third of these classes. Sir W Hamilton has also a three-fold division. There are the primary, which are all evolved from two catholic conditions of matter, the occupying of space and the being contained in space. There are the secundo-primary, which have a relation to space and motion in space, are all contained under the category of resistance or pressure, and are three in number, co-attraction, repulsion, inertia. There are the secondary, which belong to bodies only so far as they are thought to be capable of specifically determining the various parts of our nervous apparatus. (Appendix to Reid, Note D.) These classifications are valuable mainly for metaphysical purposes, and are at best to be regarded as provisional. Physical science, and it alone,, can settle some of the questions started, and it must advance several stages and tell us more of the correlation of forces, of polar action, of chemical affinity, of heat, electricity, and colour, before we can have anything like even a seemingly adequate classification of the properties of matter.

All these arrangements seem to us defective in this respect, that they omit, or at

least do not explicitly include, power, active property, force, dynamical energy. It seems clear to us, that we cannot know material objects—that we cannot know our own organism or bodies out of it except as exercising property, that is, power. Just as we know matter in our primary cognitions as extended, so we also know it as exercising property. Active property then is entitled to be placed among the primary, or at least among the secundo-primary qualities of matter. In this respect physical science is far in advance of the metaphysics which still clings to the doctrine of Descartes, and represents matter as altogether passive, and its single fundamental.